In this paper, we argue that Richard Foley’s account of rational belief faces an as yet undefeated objection, then try to repair one of Foley’s two failed replies to that objection. In §§I-III, we explain Foley’s accounts of all-things-considered rational belief and responsible belief, along with his replies to two pressing objections to those accounts—what we call the Irrelevance Objection(to Foley’s account of rational belief) and the Insufficiency Objection (to his account of responsible belief). In §IV, we argue that both (...) of Foley’s replies to the Irrelevance Objection fail as currently developed, and raise the question whether either of his replies can be salvaged. In §V, we invoke cases involving religious beliefs (broadly construed) to show that one of Foley’s failed replies to the Irrelevance Objection conflicts with his reply to the Insufficiency Objection; and we provide reason to think Foley should resolve this conflict in the latter’s favor. We conclude in §VI by suggesting a way to repair Foley’s other failed reply to the Irrelevance Objection, yielding an improved overall defense of Foley’s accounts of rational and responsible belief. We look forward to discussing the important question to what extent this improved overall defense succeeds. (shrink)

Building on Aristotle and Dewey, Mesthene argues that language plays the role of agent in the process of coming to know. He suggests a metaphysical hypothesis to account for the intelligibility of the world and elucidate the role of language in the knowing process. Mesthene's hypothesis is both interesting and important but stands in need, as the author admits, of a good bit of further investigation. J. H. Randall contributes a foreword to this volume.—A. E. J.

A selection of readings on the philosophy of logic, intended for use in introductory logic courses. Areas covered are: the nature of logic, the syllogism, the laws of thought, symbolic logic, and induction. The selections are well diversified and, for the most part, substantial.—A. E. J.

With the appearance of this book, Kierkegaard's dissertation for the master's degree, all major works of Kierkegaard are available in English. Capel's translation is felicitous, and his "historical introduction" and notes are genuinely helpful. The Concept of Irony is itself an exercise in irony, and most problems of interpretation relate to that point. Although the book is of considerable independent interest, sprinkled with wit and insight, it is likely that it will be used mainly by scholars tracing the origins of (...) Kierkegaard's thought. It should be good for a handful of dissertations, and several hands full of articles.—A. E. J. (shrink)

Those who believe that linguistic philosophy has no principles are not likely to have their opinion dispelled by Waismann's book. The book, written prior to World War II, withdrawn from the publisher and constantly modified thereafter, does not attempt to present a set of philosophical or metaphilosophical principles. What it does present is a method, applied both to traditional philosophical problems and to the central themes of linguistic philosophy. If the method has a principle, it is to be found in (...) the concept of a grammatical rule. Philosophical questions are clarified by appeal to rules of grammar, beyond which there can be no appeal. Principles was written as a textbook, and could be quite useful as such since all the important issues of analytic philosophy are raised. Despite the obvious influence of Wittgenstein, the treatment of the issues, the linguistic philosophy presented, is Waismann's own unique blend. The blend is interesting and often fruitful.—A. E. J. (shrink)

The general thesis of this small, well written, but somewhat austere, volume is that Rousseau’s concept of the state of nature is the core of his theoretical teaching. While this is not a particularly surprising thesis, Plattner does show the extent to which Rousseau radicalized the notion of the state of nature. Since Hobbes it had been almost impossible to begin a political discourse without reference to the state of nature as the point of departure. Rousseau, in effect, destroyed this (...) tradition by arguing that history rather than nature provided the true point of departure, and that natural right or natural law consequently provided no ground for political obligation. (shrink)

Tejera, strongly influenced by Dewey, operates on the working hypothesis that art is both a kind of experience and a kind of making, and addresses himself to the "inextricably related" problems of the ends and the creation of art. Creativity becomes the key; man is viewed as "the creative animal," and artistic creation is seen as a sort of natural human activity, to be understood in relation to all other human activities. Most traditional problems of aesthetics are taken up at (...) some point, but it is not quite clear how all the parts fit together. The book contains forty-five prints and, considered in terms of its physical format, is something of a work of art in its own right.—A. E. J. (shrink)

Essays on various aspects of contemporary American philosophy by nine contemporary American philosophers. The essays vary in type, ranging from quick surveys of current positions through surveys used as foils for personal opinions and defenses of particular meta-philosophical positions to contributions to particular fields which say nothing about current trends. Presumably aimed at a continental audience, the book should prove helpful to anyone who knows nothing about contemporary American philosophy.—A. E. J.

A critical examination of the religious theories of Axel Hägerström and Anders Nygren, their respective disciples, Martin Fries and Ragnar Bring, and the critical literature on the two main figures. Hemberg's study focuses on the questions: whether all reality must be referred to spatial-temporal experience; the status of metaphysics; and the nature of religious experience. The religious theories of Hägerström and Nygren are of considerable philosophical interest although, for primarily linguistic reasons, their influence outside Sweden has remained slight. Despite the (...) presence of a fifteen page English summary one suspects that interest in Hemberg's book will be similarly provincial, for similar reasons.—A. E. J. (shrink)

When David Souter was nominated by President Bush to the Supreme Court, he cited John Marshall Harlan as his model. It was an interesting choice. Admired by conservatives and deeply respected by his liberal brethren, Harlan was a man, as Justice William Brennan lamented, whose "massive scholarship" has never been fully recognized. In addition, he was the second Harlan to sit on the Court, following his grandfather--also named John Marshall Harlan. But while his grandfather was an outspoken supporter of reconstruction (...) on a conservative court, the younger Harlan emerged as a critic of the Warren Court's liberal expansion of civil liberties. Now, in the first biography of this important but neglected jurist, Tinsley Yarbrough provides a detailed account of Harlan's life, from his privileged childhood to his retirement and death. Yarbrough examines the forces and events which shaped the Justice's jurisprudence--his early life and often complex family relationships, education at Princeton and Oxford, his work as a prosecutor during Prohibition, Republican Party activities, wartime service in the Army Air Force, and years as one of the nation's preeminent corporate lawyers. The book focuses, however, on Harlan's years on the high bench. Yarbrough weaves together discussions of the Justice's relations with his brethren, clerks, and staff, an examination of Harlan's role in the decision-making process on the Court, and an analysis of his jurisprudence. The Justice's approach to constitutional interpretation exalted precedent, deference to governmental power, and narrow decisions closely tied to case facts; but he also accepted an evolving, creative model of constitutional construction which permitted expansive readings of constitutional rights. Yarbrough's details Harlan's close relationship with Justice Frankfurter, showing how--despite their friendship and alliance--Harlan strongly marked out his own position, both personally and judicially, on the Warren and Burger courts. And he examines the substance and significance of his dissents in such famous cases as Miranda and the Pentagon Papers. Intensively researched, smoothly written, and incisively argued, Yarbrough's biography offers an absorbing account of the life and career of a great dissenter, hailed by admirers as a "lawyer's lawyer" and a "judge's judge." Coming at a time when the high court has begun to adopt many of Harlan's principles, this account provides an essential perspective on the Court, civil liberties, and a pivotal figure in the history of both. (shrink)

As thinkers in the market for knowledge and agents aspiring to morally responsible action, we are inevitably subject to luck. This book presents a comprehensive new theory of luck in light of a critical appraisal of the literature's leading accounts, then brings this new theory to bear on issues in the theory of knowledge and philosophy of action.

In this paper, I first of all define various kinds of ontological dependence, motivating these definitions by appeal to examples. My contention is that whenever we need, in metaphysics, to appeal to some notion of existential or identity-dependence, one or other of these definitions will serve our needs adequately, which one depending on the case in hand. Then I respond to some objections to one of these proposed definitions in particular, namely, my definition of (what I call) essential identity-dependence. Finally, (...) I show how a similar approach can be applied in the theory of truthmaking, by offering an account of the truthmaking relation which defines it in terms of a type of essential dependence. I also say why I think that this approach is preferable to one which treats the truthmaking relation as primitive. More generally, my view is that accounts of dependence or ‘grounding’ which treat these notions as primitive are less satisfactory than my own position, which is that in all cases a suitable definition is forthcoming if we look hard enough. (shrink)

Cet article est un nouvel examen des objections soulevées par Leibniz dans la controverse avec Clarke contre la théorie absolutiste de l'espace et du temps. Or la plupart de ces objections sont fondées sur le principe de raison suffisante; mais Leibniz utilise aussi le principe de l'identité des indiscernables, qu'il prétend déduire du principe de raison suffisante . Ce qui m'intéresse c'est que Leibniz présente parfois deux versions de la même objection: l'une reposant uniquement sur le principe de raison suffisante, (...) l'autre uniquement sur le principe de l'identité des indiscernables. Se pose alors la question suivante: Leibniz aurait-il pu soulever toutes les objections qu'il voulait contre la théorie absolutiste, en utilisant seulement le principe de l'identité des indiscernables? Il me semble qu'il aurait certainement pu le faire. Et de plus, je crois que si Leibniz avait suivi cette voie, son raisonnement contre la théorie absolutiste aurait été beaucoup plus convaincant. Ainsi donc, je me propose de mener l'attaque de Leibniz contre la théorie absolutiste, en isolant, reformulant, et exposant systématiquement sept arguments dont il se servait ou dont il aurait pu se servir, qui sont tous fondés sur le principe de l'identité des indiscernables. (shrink)

One currently popular methodology of metaphysics has it that ‘intuitions’ play an evidential role with respect to metaphysical claims. This chapter defends a realist methodology of metaphysics that implies that any rational being, simply in virtue of being rational, is necessarily capable of grasping the essences of at least some mind-independent entities. The notion of essence in play here is Aristotelian, whereby an entity’s essence is captured by an account of what that entity is, or what it is to be (...) that entity. Concepts are just ways of thinking of things and, as such, may or may not be adequate to the real natures — the essences — of the things being thought of. Our ‘intuitions’, particularly as revealed by aptly constructed thought experiments, may cast interesting light on some of our concepts, but they are not and cannot be reliable guides to mind-independent truths of essence. (shrink)

s div class="title" a terTwo Notions of Being: Entity and Essence s /div a ter - Volume 62 - E. J. Lowe.

本书的论文展示了这位伟大的历史学家对研究历史的重要性热情洋溢的信念,以及深邃的分析、论说的广度和独到的见解,这些足以令他名至实归。.